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Solving the Problems of 
Economic Development Incentives 
Timothy J. Bartik
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
How can economic development incentives best be reined in? I 
agree with most students of this issue that economic development in-
centives are often wasteful. But this chapter maintains the position that 
some incentives are socially beneficial.1 The challenge is to design re-
forms that encourage dropping wasteful incentives and keeping those 
that are socially beneficial. 
To design incentive reforms, we must first agree on the causes of 
current U.S. incentive practices. This is the focus of the next section. 
What are the social benefits and costs of incentives? Why are incentives 
so often wasteful? Answering these questions allows us to address the 
problems leading to wasteful incentives, while encouraging beneficial 
incentives. 
My conclusion is that some incentives are beneficial for two rea-
sons: 1) because corporations are becoming more footloose, they are 
becoming more responsive to incentives; and 2) increased local em-
ployment rates yield social benefits. However, incentives are often 
wasteful for two reasons: 1) local policymakers often overestimate the 
benefits of incentives, and 2) the local debate over incentives is domi-
nated by business interests. Unlike some students of this issue, I do not 
think that incentives are excessive because a state government ignores 
an incentive’s “spillover costs” for other states. 
Based on this analysis, I conclude that incentive reform should fo-
cus on improving the local decision-making process for incentives. Lo-
cal decisions about incentives will be improved by a more democratic 
process with full information, a budget constraint on incentives, better 
benefit–cost analysis, incentive designs that target new business activ-
ity that brings social benefits, and performance requirements. Federal 
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policy can encourage better information about incentives, help finance 
efficient incentives in economically distressed regions, and encourage 
cooperative economic development policy in metropolitan areas that 
cross state lines. 
THE FORCES LEADING TO INCENTIVES 
Before discussing the forces leading to incentives, I should define 
what I mean by incentives. In this chapter, I focus on the type of incen-
tive that looks most like legalized bribery of the rich: cash or near-cash 
assistance provided on a discretionary basis to attract or retain business 
operations owned by large businesses. Such cash or near-cash assis-
tance includes property tax abatements, discretionary credits under the 
state’s corporate income tax, low-interest financing, and free land or 
buildings. This type of incentive deserves the most attention because, 
out of the total resources for economic development, such incentives 
comprise the largest share. For example, in Michigan such incentives 
are about three-quarters of all resources devoted to economic develop-
ment programs (Bartik, Eisinger, and Erickcek 2003).2
Other incentives to large businesses are close substitutes for cash 
assistance. Incentives to attract or retain large businesses may also in-
clude customized services, which help meet the needs of an individual 
business, such as information on potential sites, help with state or lo-
cal regulations, customized training for new or existing employees, and 
expedited provision of site-related public infrastructure, such as access 
roads. Customized services are sometimes almost equivalent to cash; 
for example, in some cases “customized training” is writing a check to 
the company to train its own employees. Another close substitute for 
discretionary cash incentives are business tax breaks provided as an 
“entitlement” under state or local tax laws, such as investment or em-
ployment expansion tax credits that go by legal right to all businesses 
that meet the tax law’s criteria. Discretionary tax incentives, such as 
property tax abatements, may become so routine that they are almost 
equivalent to “entitlement” tax breaks. Reforms to cash incentives for 
large businesses may lead to increased use of these other incentives. 
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Economic development programs also provide assistance to new 
businesses and small and medium-sized businesses, including many 
high-tech businesses, which is intended to be an “incentive” for the 
growth of such businesses. Assistance to small and medium-sized busi-
nesses includes cash assistance, such as loans or equity finance, and 
grants for research and development. Assistance to small and medium-
sized businesses may also include customized services, such as infor-
mation on how to start up a business, or make an existing one more 
profitable (e.g., industrial extension services, and small business devel-
opment centers). Reforms to incentive programs for large businesses 
may also affect these other programs. 
Is there a good rationale for state and local governments to offer 
economic development incentives to attract or retain large businesses? 
Is there a good rationale for why such incentive use appears to be ris-
ing over time? One plausible rationale is that incentives are increas-
ingly perceived as a necessary cost incurred to produce social benefits. 
It seems increasingly plausible that incentives might help attract or re-
tain business, and thereby produce benefits such as greater employment 
rates and a stronger state and local fiscal situation. I will argue that 
these statements are true, but that incentives’ costs are often large while 
incentives’ benefits are often modest. 
Incentives may increasingly affect business location decisions be-
cause businesses are increasingly footloose. As shown in Figure 5.1, 
over the past 100 years, transport and communication costs have de-
clined. Cheaper transport of inputs and outputs, and the greater ease 
of using communications and computers to coordinate business activi-
ties at distant locations, allows business activities to be sited at a wider 
variety of locations. Because businesses have many more sites that 
are acceptable options from a transport and communications perspec-
tive, businesses are much more sensitive to local costs, such as wages 
and taxes. Wages are a larger share of costs than taxes, but taxes and 
the incentives that offset them are more immediately controllable by 
government. 
Declining transport and communication costs help explain why re-
search increasingly shows a statistically significant but modest effect 
of state and local tax rates on economic development. Reviews of the 
literature suggest that the long-run elasticity of a state or metropolitan 
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area’s business activity with respect to state and local taxes is between 
−0.2 and −0.3 (Bartik 1991a, 1992; Wasylenko 1997), which means that 
a 10 percent reduction in effective state and local business tax rates (for 
example, a reduction of the state corporate income tax rate from 5.0 to 
4.5 percent, accompanied by similar reductions in other state and local 
business taxes), with state and local public services held constant, will 
increase the long-run level of local business activity by 2 or 3 percent.3
Such an effect on business activity is not huge. If the state and local 
tax cuts are financed by cutting public services, the result may be lower 
business activity. The elasticities are not large enough to produce a Laf-
fer Curve, in which cuts in tax rates would raise the tax base enough to 
increase revenue. The estimates imply that the gross cost of creating a 
job through lower business tax rates is a sacrifice of $10,000 annually 
per job in lower business tax revenue. The higher business tax base 
would offset only about a quarter of this “static” revenue loss, resulting 
in a net cost of creating a job through lower business tax rates of about 
Figure 5.1  Relative Transportation and Communication Costs
NOTE: The fi gure sets transport and communication costs equal to 100 for the fi rst year 
for which such cost data are available in the UN report. Each type of cost therefore 
uses a different base period. This allows all the data to be placed on one graph.
SOURCE: These data are derived from United Nations Development Programme 
(1999, p. 30). This particular presentation was developed by Rodrigue, Comtois, and 
Slack (2004).
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$7,000 per year in foregone business tax revenue. At a 10 percent real 
discount rate, the present value cost in foregone business tax revenue is 
$70,000 per job created.4 Still, for state or local officials searching for 
some way to affect the local economy, lowering taxes seems one of the 
few options. 
These figures are for business tax cuts for an entire state or metro-
politan area. Research suggests that a business tax cut by an individual 
suburb within a metropolitan area, holding the taxes of other jurisdic-
tions constant, has much larger effects, perhaps 10 times as great per 
dollar of incentive. That is, a 10 percent cut in an individual suburb’s 
business taxes, such as a cut in the business property tax rate from 2 
percent to 1.8 percent, will increase that individual suburb’s business 
activity by 20 percent, largely by capturing business activity from other 
jurisdictions in the same metropolitan area. These larger effects make 
sense because individual jurisdictions within a metropolitan area are 
closer substitutes for one another than different states are for one anoth-
er, as jurisdictions within the same metropolitan area offer more similar 
access to markets and inputs. The research is mixed on whether busi-
ness tax cuts for large central cities have significant effects on business 
location (Bartik 1991a, 1992; Haughwout et al. 2003). 
What implications do these estimated effects of state and local busi-
ness tax cuts have for the effects of incentives? Few studies directly 
estimate the effects of incentives. However, under the assumption that 
a “dollar is a dollar,” tax incentives for a large business should have 
similar effects on its location decisions to an equal dollar-sized busi-
ness tax cut. Therefore, the effects of incentives on the probability of a 
particular branch plant locating in a state should, on average, be such 
as to yield the same expected gross dollar cost per job as business tax 
cuts. For example, the highest incentive offers, according to Fisher and 
Peters (2002), are equivalent to an annual subsidy of about $2,800 per 
worker inside some enterprise zones.5 To be consistent with the busi-
ness location literature, reducing business taxes via an incentive offer of 
$2,800 per job for a branch plant, compared to no incentive offer, would 
increase the probability of a new branch plant choosing the state by 
about 0.3.6 This implies that for every 10 plants offered such an incen-
tive, the incentive would be decisive for about 3 of them. The incentives 
given to the other 7 plants would have no effects on business location or 
employment growth. The only effect would be an extra cost to state and 
up07amritcCh.5.indd   107 4/11/2008   10:40:30 AM
108   Bartik
local governments of these unneeded 7 incentives. Unless economic 
developers can somehow determine which of the 10 plants “needs” the 
incentive to tip its location decision, this loss on 7 of the 10 plants is 
a necessary cost to tip the location decision of the other 3 plants. For 
smaller, more “normal” incentives, an even lower percentage of loca-
tion decisions would be tipped by incentives. Fisher and Peters’ figures 
imply that the mean state/local economic development incentive out-
side of enterprise zones is equivalent to an annual subsidy of about 
$300 per worker. Such an incentive would be expected to affect the 
location decision of only 3 out of 100 subsidized companies.7
The benefits of greater job growth in a metropolitan area occur in 
the form of earnings increases for local residents who get jobs as the 
local employment rate increases, earnings increases for local residents 
who move up to better-paying jobs with a tighter local labor market, 
local property value increases, profit increases in local businesses that 
have a head start in serving a larger local market, and tax base increases 
for state and local governments.8 These benefits must be netted against 
costs of greater local job growth, including the value of the foregone 
nonwork time for local residents who gain jobs, the costs of additional 
public services required by expanding employment and population, and 
environmental costs. 
We have reasonable estimates of the magnitude of these benefits 
and costs and how they are affected by differences in local conditions 
and the type of job growth (Bartik 1991a, 1993). A 1 percent increase 
in local employment is associated in the long run (more than five years) 
with an increase of 0.8 percent in local population, implying that 8 out 
of 10 new jobs in a metropolitan area go to persons who otherwise 
would have lived elsewhere. This 1 percent job increase is also associ-
ated with a 0.2 percent increase in the local employment rate (employ-
ment to population ratio), as local residents increase their labor force 
participation as they acquire better job skills with their greater job expe-
rience. One percent extra job growth in the long run is associated with 
average real wages moving up by 0.1 to 0.2 percent, but due entirely to 
local residents moving up to better-paying occupations; the real wages 
of particular occupations are unchanged, with occupational wages just 
matching increases in local prices. At low unemployment rates, when 
jobs are easy to get, the value of time spent unemployed, which econo-
mists call the reservation wage, may be 90 percent of the market wages, 
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which would imply a cost of foregone nonwork time of 0.18 percent in 
a low unemployment labor market due to 1 percent extra job growth. 
The required public services due to growth should, in the long run, 
increase about the same as the tax base for employment growth that is 
accompanied by the same population growth and involves no occupa-
tional upgrading. But as detailed above, the employment growth due to 
the “labor demand” shock caused by economic development policies 
will raise employment rates and increase real wages due to occupa-
tional upgrading. If employment rates go up, tax revenues should in-
crease faster than public spending needs for three reasons: 1) business 
growth by itself brings tax revenue greater than public services, esti-
mated as $1.70 in taxes per dollar of required public services according 
to one source (Oakland and Testa 1996); 2) increased employment rates 
should reduce required state spending for transfers, reducing welfare 
spending by about 6 percent for a 1 percent increase in employment 
growth (Bartik and Eberts 1999), and unemployment benefit outlays by 
about 3 percent (Bartik 1991b); and 3) increased employment rates will 
raise personal tax revenues per capita, by a percent equal to the percent 
increase in the employment rate. Increases in real wages, such as those 
caused by the occupational upgrading due to increased labor demand, 
will also raise personal tax revenues, which should go up approximately 
proportionately with the increased real wages. In the short run, public 
service costs associated with growth will go up less than the percentage 
increase in employment and population if there is excess capacity in 
local infrastructure. On the other hand, if new infrastructure is required, 
and the depreciation cost of the current infrastructure is not reflected in 
local budgets, then most estimates suggest that additional public service 
costs will significantly exceed new tax revenues in the short-run (Alt-
shuler and Gomez-Ibanez 1993). 
One percent extra employment growth will increase local property 
values by 0.4 percent. However, the present value of the increased earn-
ings from growth are at least triple the size of the property value gains 
(Bartik 1991a, 1994b). In addition to increases in property values due 
to increased land demand, the value of “brownfield” property that is 
cleaned up as part of an economic development project may also go up 
due to removing this development barrier. Other local asset values will 
also change: locally owned businesses that have some comparative ad-
vantage in selling to a local market will increase their profits, whereas 
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locally owned businesses that sell to an external market may lose profits 
due to increased wages and rents. 
Other than brownfield clean-up, most environmental effects of 
growth are likely to be negative, but will vary greatly with project 
details. In addition, changes in community character that accompany 
growth may be viewed negatively by the original local residents. 
The net effects of greater job growth are likely to be progressive, 
as lower-income groups are more likely to be initially nonemployed 
or employed in low-wage jobs. Therefore, most estimates suggest that 
the lowest income quintile probably has earnings gains that are three 
or four times greater, in percentage terms, than the earnings gains of 
the average family, and income gains that are around twice as great, in 
percentage terms, as the real income gains of the average family (Bar-
tik 1994b). However, the actual dollar effects on earnings and income 
of the lowest income quintile are less than that of the average family, 
as many low-income individuals are disconnected from the labor mar-
ket (Bartik 2001, Table 5.3). The progressivity of increased job growth 
is considerably less than the progressivity of redistributive social pro-
grams, which deliver their greatest dollar benefits to the lowest income 
quintile (Bartik 1994b). 
The bottom line from this analysis is that for an average incentive 
project in a low unemployment local labor market, benefits and costs 
are of similar magnitude (Bartik 1991a, p. 183). The chapter’s appen-
dix and its accompanying table present some illustrative calculations. 
There is sufficient uncertainty about the estimated effects of taxes on 
growth, and growth on local economic variables, that whether the net 
benefits are positive or negative is unclear. Benefits and costs will vary 
greatly with project particulars. 
Social benefits of incentives are greater if the project overcomes 
“market failures” that impede the use of local resources.9 For example, 
social benefits are greater if the project helps overcome involuntary un-
employment or underemployment that impedes workers from being em-
ployed or being employed in higher-wage jobs. Social benefits will be 
greater if local employment rates increase more, or local residents move 
up to higher-paying jobs to a greater extent, or if the local labor market 
is more depressed. An increasing local employment rate provides more 
earnings benefits to local residents, reduces the need for social services 
to the nonemployed, and reduces the public services costs and envi-
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ronmental costs associated with increased population. An increase in 
higher-paying jobs for local residents increases earnings benefits, and 
increases fiscal benefits by reduced social services and increased taxes. 
In a more depressed local labor market, the nonemployed will be more 
desperate for jobs and have lower reservation wages. 
Social benefits will also be greater if the current public infrastruc-
ture is underutilized, which allows increased employment and popula-
tion growth to increase tax revenue without a commensurate increase 
in public infrastructure costs. This is more likely in a local area that 
has been sufficiently economically distressed that it has lost population 
and employment from some previous peak. Social benefits will also be 
greater if the project overcomes regulatory and other barriers that pre-
vent brownfields from being productively used. 
But policymakers should also be aware that social benefits of 
growth will be much reduced under any of the following circumstances: 
low-unemployment local labor markets; lower wages of the new jobs; 
fewer local workers for the new jobs; significant public infrastructure 
or environmental costs. For example, estimates suggest that if the job 
growth is in industries that pay 10 or 15 percent less than the aver-
age industry controlling for worker characteristics, then the job growth 
may produce no earnings benefits for local residents (Bartik 2004b). If 
there are zero earnings benefits from additional employment growth, 
and consequently little if any fiscal benefits, it is highly unlikely that an 
incentive package will pass a benefit-cost test unless it has extremely 
low costs per job created. 
Therefore, incentives can affect business location, and increased 
job growth can yield important social benefits. We would expect in-
formed state governments, or metropolitan agencies concerned with 
economic development, that are maximizing the well-being of all their 
residents, to only offer incentives if the benefits outweigh the costs. 
These calculations would consider that only a fraction of incentive of-
fers would prove decisive, and only a fraction of newly created jobs 
would go to local residents. Policymakers would consider the circum-
stances of the local economy, the environmental costs or benefits, the 
quality of the new jobs, and who is hired for those new jobs. So, what 
is the problem? 
The problem is that many incentives currently being offered in the 
United States have costs that exceed benefits. For example, in 2001 Chi-
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cago awarded large incentives to the Boeing Corporation for relocating 
its headquarters, even though the jobs would go to relocated workers, 
which eliminates many of the labor market benefits. 
One cause of wasteful incentives is ignorance. Policymakers as-
sume that all growth is good. They assume that all incentive offers are 
decisive. It is often assumed that benefits can be measured by looking 
at the earnings and tax base associated with the new business activity. 
This assumption forgets that only a portion of the new jobs go to local 
residents and the unemployed, and that new public expenditures will be 
required. 
But there may be reasons for ignorance. As Upton Sinclair (1935) 
said, “It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his 
salary depends upon his not understanding it.” Local economic devel-
opment decisions have been dominated by local business interests, in-
cluding Chambers of Commerce, newspapers, banks, and real estate 
developers. From these groups’ perspectives, the benefits of economic 
development are the increase in the value of their property, including 
the value of local business assets, and this increase in local capital val-
ues is closely related to the earnings and tax base increase of the new 
plant. Furthermore, the costs of the incentives, including the incentives 
that do not work, will be borne largely by the general public. There 
is truth to the observation by Logan and Molotch (1987, pp. 50–51) 
that, “For those who count, the city is a growth machine, one that can 
increase aggregate rents and trap related wealth for those in the right 
position to benefit.” 
Unlike some analysts of incentives, I do not think the fundamental 
problem is that a state government (or a metropolitan-wide economic 
development authority) fails to take into account the negative effects of 
its incentives on other states. If all states had rational incentive regimes, 
on the margin investors in each state would be charged a tax rate net 
of incentives that would reflect the marginal public service and envi-
ronmental costs, net of any employment benefits, that the investment 
caused. Under those conditions, a state’s incentive that attracts a mar-
ginal plant that would have otherwise gone to another state causes no 
net cost for that other state. Of course, states don’t usually have rational 
incentive regimes, and so it is likely that attracting this marginal plant 
would cause net social costs (or benefits, depending upon the net effect 
in the other state) for the state that otherwise would have received this 
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investment. But this “externality” is not the fundamental problem, rath-
er it reflects the fundamental problem: each state lacks, from its own 
self-interested perspective, a rational incentive regime that maximizes 
the interests of all state residents. 
Critics who argue that incentives negatively affect other states also 
argue that states are offering incentives so excessive that the social costs 
of attracting these new plants exceed the social benefits. If this is the 
case for all states, then if state X attracts a plant that would have gone 
to state Y, state X is doing state Y a favor by saving it from a wasteful 
incentive. 
This analysis so far has considered economic development deci-
sions by a state or an entire metropolitan area, and asks whether a state 
or metropolitan area acting rationally has the proper incentive to con-
sider all benefits and costs. The analysis is different when we consider 
economic development decisions for an individual suburban jurisdic-
tion. For an individual suburban jurisdiction attracting a new plant, the 
main effects on the jurisdiction itself are effects on the jurisdiction’s tax 
base and the jurisdiction’s environmental quality. The net fiscal costs 
of providing public services to additional households attracted by the 
new business activity will mostly be incurred by other jurisdictions in 
the metropolitan area, or by the state government, as most workers in 
an individual suburban jurisdiction do not live there. The employment 
benefits of increased employment rates and promotions to better-paying 
occupations will also mostly be received by residents of other jurisdic-
tions. The decisions of individual suburban jurisdictions about incen-
tives have no strong reason to fully reflect all these social costs and 
benefits. 
ALTERNATIVE INCENTIVE REFORMS 
Given this economic context, what incentive reforms are desirable? 
This section evaluates the merits of possible reforms. Although some 
reforms are mutually exclusive, others could be combined. 
Maintain traditional state and local policies towards business, 
but remain competitive in the global economy. State and local gov-
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ernments would maintain their traditional business tax systems and not 
offer any incentives or other business cost reductions to improve the 
local business climate. As mentioned previously, this traditional sys-
tem imposed state and local taxes on business that exceeded the public 
services to business, with $1.70 in business taxes per dollar of public 
services to business (Oakland and Testa 1996). 
For most state and local areas, I doubt whether this alternative will 
prove politically viable. The mobility of business is increasing. Most 
state and local areas will sometimes experience high unemployment 
that will lead to public demands for action, and this high unemployment 
will also increase the benefits of growth. There is enough evidence that 
business taxes and incentives affect local growth that business interests 
will be able to argue for reduced taxes or increased incentives to reduce 
unemployment. The argument for doing something will win out over 
the argument for doing nothing. 
Localism. Rather than competing for mobile capital, local areas 
could “just say no,” eliminate incentives for mobile corporations, and 
rely on locally generated capital. The best articulation of this approach 
is in Michael Shuman’s (2000) book, Going Local, although this ap-
proach appeals to many American community activists. Shuman advo-
cates community corporations with voting shares controlled by local 
residents, with these community corporations making the local econ-
omy more self-sufficient by producing goods and services that replace 
imports of goods and services from other local areas. 
The main problem with this approach is that greater reliance on 
local capital and local production would significantly reduce an area’s 
real per capita income. There are static and dynamic gains from trade 
and capital mobility. Local areas should be free to pursue this option, 
but local residents should understand the costs. 
Develop unique local assets that yield economic rents. Local ar-
eas can develop unique assets that make their area significantly more 
valuable to large businesses than these businesses’ next best alternative, 
so that these large businesses receive what economists call an “econom-
ic rent” from the local area. This “economic rent” would allow business 
taxation in excess of public service costs without offering incentives to 
attract or retain these large businesses. One unique local asset would be 
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a unique cluster of industries that increases productivity by resulting 
in more new ideas, and greater availability of specialized inputs such 
as workers with special skills (Rosenfeld 2002a,b). Another unique lo-
cal asset would be distinctive local amenities that attract what Florida 
(2002) calls the “creative class,” the professional and technical workers 
who enhance productivity for many high-tech businesses. 
The problem is that for most local areas, it is difficult to develop 
unique industry clusters or local amenities. Businesses will have many 
options of similar metropolitan areas that offer advantages from indus-
try clusters and local amenities. There are then no economic rents for 
local areas to exploit, and offering incentives must at least be seriously 
considered. 
Lower overall business tax rates. Faced with businesses with many 
location options, localities can respond by lowering overall business tax 
rates rather than offering special incentives. This low-tax alternative to 
incentives is favored by many conservative critics of incentives. 
The problem is that this change would significantly reduce tax rev-
enue, forcing difficult choices on state and local governments about 
raising household taxes, or cutting public services or transfers. These 
problems would be particularly acute in economically distressed local 
areas. 
Lower marginal tax rates on new business operations. Rather 
than cutting business tax rates across the board, state and local areas 
could give tax credits or deductions for business investment or employ-
ment expansion. Compared to overall business tax reductions, this re-
sults in less of a short-run or medium-run revenue loss. Reductions in 
taxes on new business operations are similar to incentives, but would be 
provided as an entitlement to all businesses meeting the law’s criteria, 
rather than in a discretionary manner to approved businesses. 
Providing tax breaks as an entitlement, rather than at discretion, in 
theory encourages a state or local government to analyze the impact 
of the tax break in toto. In practice, such tax breaks are not reviewed 
closely. In addition, entitlement tax breaks, compared to discretionary 
tax breaks, do not allow the advantages of being selective, such as se-
lecting projects in which assistance is more likely to tip the location 
decision, or the location has greater benefits. 
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Make discretionary incentives truly selective. As mentioned be-
fore, many discretionary incentives are provided so automatically to 
projects that they become equivalent to a tax break provided as an en-
titlement. Economic developers can be forced to become selective by 
requiring the number of incentives be capped, or better, that the dollar 
volume of incentives be capped. Criteria can be required for selecting 
incentive winners from incentive applicants, such as evidence that this 
incentive will tip the location decision, and benefit-cost analyses of the 
projects. Michigan’s “MEGA” program, for example, which provides 
large tax credits to attract or retain businesses, has limits on the annual 
number of projects. It requires that all projects present data showing 
that a non-Michigan site would be more profitable without the incen-
tive, and that all projects be subject to fiscal impact analysis.10
Capping incentive volume limits incentive costs. Political debate 
on the incentive cap may lead to a broader debate about the incentive 
regime. Whether government officials can determine if the incentive 
is needed to tip the location decision is more questionable. However, 
requiring businesses to legally certify, with official financial figures, 
that without the incentive the business would have located elsewhere, 
might discourage some egregious cases where clearly the incentive was 
irrelevant to the location decision. Finally, models can be developed 
to provide reasonably accurate estimates of the labor market and fiscal 
benefits of a new facility. 
Transparency. The details of incentives and incentive offers can 
be required to be clearly publicly disclosed. This disclosure promotes 
broader public debate. If the incentive offers are reported in a consistent 
fashion nationally, the disclosure may also give economic developers 
a more accurate knowledge of what alternatives are open to business 
location decision makers, which should improve the bargaining posi-
tion of economic developers. Businesses already know what they have 
been offered by different local areas, but economic developers do not. 
The national collection of this information would allow better research 
on incentives. Finally, transparency is essential for any incentive regu-
lation by the federal government or supranational organizations. The 
European Union requires public disclosure of incentives by its member 
states, and disclosure and transparency are encouraged by international 
trade agreements. 
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Metrowide economic development programs, not within-metro 
competition. State governments can require that incentives not be pro-
vided by individual local governments, but only by the state as a whole 
or by metrowide organizations or coalitions. As discussed previously, 
local governments that are a small part of the local labor market will 
not consider many important social effects of business growth when 
offering incentives, such as the labor market benefits throughout the 
metropolitan area, and the fiscal effects of increased metropolitan popu-
lation. This makes it unlikely that incentive policies conducted by small 
individual local governments will be optimal. A metrowide perspec-
tive would seem to be a minimum requirement for incentive policy to 
consider the full range of economic and fiscal effects. One limitation 
of state governments in this regard is that some metro areas cross state 
boundaries, a subject considered below. 
Better benefi t-cost analyses. State legislatures can require that 
all economic development incentive offers be subject to a prospec-
tive benefit-cost analysis to estimate whether their incentive offers are 
efficient. This analysis would estimate employment benefits, including 
what proportion of the new jobs would likely go to local residents, par-
ticularly unemployed local residents; wage effects, including the wage 
rate paid on the jobs for workers of given credentials versus current 
local jobs held by local residents with similar credentials; fiscal effects, 
including local as well as state effects, effects on required public ex-
penditure as well as taxes, and analysis of the capacity of existing in-
frastructure to accommodate job growth; and environmental effects. If 
the estimates are high quality, they increase the likelihood of the right 
incentive choices. Even imperfect estimates would encourage debate on 
some relevant issues about incentives. 
Job quality and other project standards. As suggested by Greg 
LeRoy and the organization “Good Jobs First,” as well as others, states 
could require that all projects awarded incentives meet some minimum 
standard for job quality (LeRoy 1999; Nolan and LeRoy 2003; Purinton 
et al. 2003). In theory, concerns about job quality are already addressed 
as one component of the benefit-cost analysis. Decisions should be 
based on the net benefits of the incentive, not just on whether the project 
met a job-quality standard. However, as a check on the incentive deci-
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sion-making process, it might be wise to identify in advance some mini-
mum standards for projects, under the assumption that projects failing 
to meet standards would be unlikely to pass a benefit-cost test. Projects 
that did not meet these minimum standards would have to go through 
a special review process to be approved. These minimum standards 
would give economic developers a summary of what types of projects 
they would be encouraged to pursue, and would give the public and 
policymakers extra assurance that there is some selectivity involved in 
the benefit-cost analysis process. Benefit-cost analysis is too often a 
“black box” dominated by technical experts. Standards may help clarify 
what the analysis process is trying to do. 
More up-front incentives. Studies indicate that corporate execu-
tives use very high real discount rates in making investment decisions, 
averaging 12 percent (Summers and Poterba 1992). For business loca-
tion decisions, this implies that the portion of the property tax abate-
ment provided 10 years from now is almost completely irrelevant to the 
location decision, because the business decision maker is focused on 
shorter-term profit objectives. On the other hand, most studies suggest 
that governments should use social discount rates much lower than 12 
percent. To serve the public interest, governments should have a longer 
time horizon than corporate executives. 
As a result, it is possible to have a greater effect on business loca-
tion decisions at a lower cost by providing a greater proportion of the 
incentive up front. Up-front incentives also force state and local politi-
cal leaders to immediately deal with incentives’ costs, rather than pass 
on costs to their successors. However, providing more up-front incen-
tives brings to the forefront the issue of whether the incentive can be re-
covered if the location decision does not provide the promised benefits, 
for example, if the company relocates. To provide more incentives up 
front, a greater proportion of the incentive can be provided as custom-
ized training or infrastructure, or tax incentives can be made larger but 
shorter term. 
Clawbacks. The net benefits of an incentive regime increase when 
some of the incentive can be recovered if the business receiving the 
incentive does not provide the planned social benefits, for example, if 
the business relocates or the number of jobs created falls short of pro-
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jections.11 This can be dealt with by legally binding “clawback” pro-
visions, which recover some portion of the up-front incentives if the 
business does not meet performance goals. State use of clawback pro-
visions is increasing, with the number increasing from 9 to 17 between 
1992 and 2002 (Peirce 2002). It is believed that local use of clawbacks 
is also increasing. Surveys of local governments show that 59 percent 
of local governments claim they “always” require a performance agree-
ment as a condition for incentives, and an additional 30 percent of local 
governments claim they “sometimes” require a performance agreement 
(Bartik 2004a). 
The main potential problem with clawbacks is that if they are unduly 
onerous, they may be a disincentive to attracting businesses. However, 
if they are designed with incentives so they are clearly related to the 
social benefits associated with the business, then businesses that expect 
to make a long-term investment in the community should not perceive 
clawbacks as a huge disincentive to their location decisions. 
Redesign incentives to focus more on the social benefi ts of bus-
iness growth.12 As discussed above, the largest portion of the so-
cial benefits of growth arise from increasing local employment rates. 
Increasing such rates provides the unemployed with greater job experi-
ence, puts upward pressure on local wages, and increases local taxes 
more than public spending needs. Local employment rates are most 
likely to go up when the new business hires the unemployed, and least 
likely to go up when the new business hires in-migrants. The rates may 
go up when the new business hires local residents who are already em-
ployed, as this creates a job vacancy that may be filled by the local 
unemployed. 
Therefore, incentives will be more targeted on the projects with 
greatest social benefits if the amount of the incentive is based on whom 
the business hires. Incentives should be somewhat greater for projects 
that hire local residents, and considerably greater if the business hires 
the unemployed.13 More benefits of greater employment experience oc-
cur in the first year of employment, so it would be justifiable for greater 
incentives to be provided for the initial hiring of the unemployed and 
their first year of employment, and somewhat smaller incentives for 
subsequent years. In addition to targeting incentives on projects that 
provide greater social benefits, such incentives will encourage busi-
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nesses to do more hiring of the unemployed. Such hiring incentives will 
be more effective if tied to local programs that attempt to screen and 
train potential hires from among the unemployed, which I discuss next 
(Bartik 2001, Chapter 8). Finally, tying incentives to the provision of 
social benefits is an automatic “clawback,” as the incentive that is not 
paid until the benefit is delivered does not need to be “clawbacked” if 
the benefit is not delivered. 
Tie incentives to participation in “fi rst source” hiring pro-
grams.14 Many local governments have some nominal requirement for 
local hiring by businesses receiving incentives, but frequently these 
requirements are unenforced because of fears of discouraging busi-
ness locations. A few cities, such as Portland (Oregon), with its now-
defunct JobNet program, and Berkeley, with its First Source program, 
have tried to encourage local hiring without adversely affecting busi-
ness locations. These programs combine a moderate requirement—that 
businesses “consider” hiring workers referred by the program—with a 
public service to help businesses overcome the many difficulties they 
face in finding productive workers to fill jobs with few formal creden-
tial requirements. Studies suggest that one-quarter of new hires in small 
and medium-sized firms are producing less than 75 percent of what the 
employer anticipated after six months on the job (Bishop 1993). These 
difficulties may occur in part because job performance is so dependent 
on “soft skills,” such as showing up at work on time and getting along 
with co-workers and customers, and these soft skills are hard to observe 
in the normal hiring process. Because normal hiring so often is disap-
pointing to employers, a program that can train and screen qualified 
workers, who are then considered for hiring by employers receiving in-
centives, can potentially help businesses find productive workers. Local 
public agencies may have some comparative advantage over private 
businesses, particularly private businesses from out of town, in work-
ing with neighborhood groups, churches, and social service agencies 
to find productive workers for jobs with low credential requirements. 
Local public agencies may also be better able than businesses to mobi-
lize resources for training from local workforce agencies and the local 
community college. 
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Focus incentives on in-kind up-front services such as custom-
ized training and access roads and other infrastructure. Customized 
training and infrastructure are incentives that inherently are concentrat-
ed up front and therefore have the advantages of up-front incentives 
mentioned previously, including a greater effect on location decisions 
per present value dollar of incentive. They also can be at least partially 
clawed back, without legal proceedings, as the infrastructure and most 
of the trained workers will remain in the local area even if the busi-
ness relocates or downsizes. Customized training can be designed to in-
crease the likelihood that a greater proportion of those trained and hired 
are local residents who otherwise would be unemployed (see Batt and 
Osterman [1993] and Osterman and Batt [1993] for some examples in 
North Carolina’s customized training programs). Finally, both custom-
ized training and infrastructure can be justified as making public ser-
vices more effective, rather than unjustifiably treating some businesses 
more favorably than others. For example, public infrastructure, such as 
highways, is supposed to be provided in response to demand. Providing 
access highways as part of an incentive package is only an “incentive” 
because the access highway is expedited to the top of the “to do” list. It 
could be argued that making the provision of highways more responsive 
to changes in demand makes government more responsive. It could also 
be argued that training programs can increase their quality by becoming 
more customized to the needs of both those receiving the training and 
those organizations that will demand the skills of those trained. 
Federal intervention in incentive policy. In theory, federal in-
tervention could be used to require or encourage all of these recom-
mendations for more effective incentive policy. However, absent some 
rationale for why there is a national interest in incentive policy, there 
is no reason to think that federal intervention will be any wiser than 
state and local incentive policies. There is some reason to think that 
federal intervention would make things worse. The federal government 
has less knowledge about local labor market institutions, which might 
be important, for example, in designing customized training programs. 
The federal government will also have less of other “local knowledge”: 
less knowledge about job needs of different groups, the hiring practices 
of local employers, the problems caused by particular environmentally 
contaminated properties, the capacity of particular local infrastructure, 
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etc. In addition, the federal government is likely to be less responsive to 
local needs. Because the benefits and costs of incentive policies depend 
on the details of the local labor market and local fiscal structure, effec-
tive policymaking depends on an intimate knowledge and responsive-
ness to these details. Federal intervention is at a disadvantage. 
Federal government intervention in incentive policy is particularly 
likely to be casually reckless if it is free of cost constraints, accomplish-
ing its goals by regulating or taxing state and local incentives it wants 
to prevent rather than subsidizing incentives it wants to encourage. For 
example, some have proposed having Congress ban or heavily tax in-
centives (Minge 1999; Burstein and Rolnick 1995). As argued previ-
ously, some incentives have social benefits, and assuming the “federal 
incentive tax” was not easy to evade, a uniform tax would discourage 
these beneficial incentives. For example, an economically distressed 
city may find that economic development incentives are part of the best 
policy package for its economic revitalization. If a federal incentive 
tax prevents these incentives, that distressed city may have to adopt an 
inferior revitalization package—for example, one that tries to make the 
city competitive by lowering overall business tax rates and making cuts 
in redistributive public services. However, in practice I would suspect 
that most federal incentive taxes would be easy to evade, so this policy 
would serve little purpose except political posturing. 
In theory, federal intervention could be more selective than a uni-
form federal incentive tax, which would make the intervention more 
beneficial. For example, Congress could only impose the federal incen-
tive tax on incentives provided by affluent local areas. However, I am 
skeptical that Congressional intervention would be so enlightened.15 If 
Congress is able to gain revenue, or at least not lose revenue, by regulat-
ing state and local economic development activities, I suspect that this 
unfettered intervention would be just as likely to discourage efficient 
economic development programs as inefficient programs. 
Federal intervention in incentive policy is more likely to be effec-
tive if it is 1) targeted on instances where there is a clear national in-
terest in state and local incentive policy, and 2) accomplished through 
federal subsidies rather than taxes and regulation, which forces some 
awareness of costs by federal decision makers. Three types of federal 
interventions appear justified based on national interests. First, federal 
dollars should continue to be provided for initiatives that seek to target 
up07amritcCh.5.indd   122 4/11/2008   10:40:33 AM
Solving the Problems of Economic Development Incentives   123
economically distressed areas, such as Empowerment Zones and the 
New Markets Initiative. The rationale for this intervention is that there 
is a national interest in promoting a more progressive income distribu-
tion, which such initiatives help accomplish. Second, federal dollars 
should be provided for rigorous prospective and retrospective benefit-
cost analyses of economic development incentives. In the process of 
evaluating these incentives, such study will disclose exactly what incen-
tives are being offered in different states. The incentive offers from the 
different states should be compiled by the federal government into a da-
tabase that would be publicly available. The rationale for this interven-
tion is that information on what incentives are being offered, and these 
incentives’ effectiveness, is a public good with benefits to economic 
developers and the public in all states. Third, federal dollars should be 
provided to help fund metrowide economic development organizations, 
with extra funding for metrowide economic development organizations 
that extend across state boundaries. The federal government has some 
advantage over the states in encouraging cooperation that might benefit 
an interstate metro area as a whole.
CONCLUSION 
Wasteful economic development incentives should be dealt with 
largely by opening up the incentives policy process at the state and lo-
cal level to broader public participation and debate. To promote more 
effective public participation, we should continually improve our data 
on and analyses of the benefits and costs of incentives. Broader public 
participation and better analysis should lead to the specific reforms that 
are discussed in this chapter. 
Such a reformed incentive policy would only offer incentives selec-
tively, subject to an overall budget constraint. Incentive offers would 
be coordinated at the metrowide or state level. Full public information 
would be available on all incentive offers and their results. Incentive of-
fers would be subject to a prospective benefit–cost analysis, have some 
minimum standards for job quality, and have provisions for recovering 
incentives if performance goals were not achieved. Incentives would 
focus on encouraging more hiring of the unemployed, for example, 
up07amritcCh.5.indd   123 4/11/2008   10:40:33 AM
124   Bartik
through hiring subsidies and customized training grants. Economic de-
velopment incentives should be seen as a part of an overall policy to 
improve local labor markets. Economic development incentives should 
be used to increase labor demand for those local residents who are un-
employed or underemployed. Such local demand policies should be 
coordinated with local labor supply policies, which would provide the 
training and education needed for local residents to succeed in these 
new and better jobs. In addition to overcoming barriers to the efficient 
working of local labor markets, economic development incentives 
should be used to overcome barriers preventing the use of brownfields, 
and to encourage use of underutilized public infrastructure. 
A “bottom-up” approach to reforming incentives, by working at the 
state and local level to improve incentive policy, is likely to be more 
effective, more durable, and more democratic than a heavy-handed 
“top-down” approach of using federal intervention to prevent certain 
practices. Federal policy can be more helpful by providing financial 
support for “bottom-up” reform: subsidizing better benefit-cost analy-
ses and information on incentives, encouraging stronger coordination 
of incentives at the metro level, and targeting assistance on economi-
cally distressed local areas. 
Incentive reforms are preferable to incentive abolition, as there are 
real economic forces that in some cases make incentives a desirable 
policy. Attempting to abolish incentives will lead to even more wasteful 
policies to create a “good business climate.” 
If one believes the government can take wise action, it is sensible 
to allow state and local governments the flexibility to use incentives. 
We should have a reasonable faith in state and local governments as 
“laboratories of democracy.” State and local experimentation in eco-
nomic development incentives can lead to better public policies if the 
public has the information and participation needed to allow for incen-
tive reforms.
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Appendix 5A
Plausible Calculations of Medium-Term Benefits 
and Costs of Economic Development Incentive 
Programs for a State or Metropolitan Area
This appendix presents in table form plausible medium-term flows of 
benefits and costs associated with an economic development incentive pro-
gram. The table is an expansion and updating of calculations I have previously 
presented in Bartik (1991a, 1992, 1994b, 2004a) and Bartik, Eisinger, and Er-
ickcek (2003). The incentive program considered is for a state or a metropoli-
tan area. The benefits and costs estimated are for the residents of the state and 
metropolitan area, and their governments and businesses. Benefits and costs 
to the federal government, or to persons, businesses, or governments outside 
the state or metropolitan area, are not considered. The benefits and costs are 
calculated as annual flows over some medium term after the incentives are pro-
vided, say, five years. Some table entries also speculate about shorter-term or 
longer-term benefits and costs. Benefits and costs are calculated in two ways: 
1) as percentages of annual state or local personal income for a 1 percent once-
and-for-all labor demand increase to state or metropolitan area employment, 
with this 1 percent employment increase induced by incentives of average ef-
fectiveness; and 2) as real dollars, using prices of 2003, per job induced by 
incentives of average effectiveness. This appendix will go through Table 5A.1 
line by line, explaining how each line is calculated based on the research litera-
ture and various data sources.
The gross incentive costs (line [1]) are derived assuming the response of 
state or metropolitan employment with respect to an incentive will be equiva-
lent in gross costs to the foregone business tax revenue to induce increased 
local activity if the elasticity of local employment with respect to state and 
local business taxes is −0.25. As derived in Note 4, the gross foregone business 
tax revenue per induced job (line [1], column B) is dR/dJ = (JdT)/dJ = T(1/E), 
where dR is the gross change in business tax revenue due to a reduction in 
business taxes, J is the number of jobs, dJ is the number of induced jobs, T is 
the business tax rate calculated as state and local business taxes per job, dT is 
the change in that tax rate, and E is the elasticity of state and local employment 
with respect to the business tax rate, which is assumed to be −0.25, a compro-
mise between the −0.3 preferred in the literature review of Bartik (1992) and 
the −0.2 preferred by Wasylenko (1997). Business tax revenue per job is calcu-
lated as detailed in Note 4. Line (1)(A) is derived in similar manner, using the 
up07amritcCh.5.indd   125 4/11/2008   10:40:33 AM
126   B
artik
Table 5A.1  Estimated Benefi ts and Costs of Economic Development Incentives
Category
Benefits/costs as % of 
local personal income for 
1% induced employment 
growth (column A) 
Benefits/costs in annual 
real 2003 dollars per 
induced job (column B) 
(1) Incentive costs −0.218 −9,699
(2) Fiscal effects 
(2.1)   Induced revenue from additional business tax base 0.055 2,425
(2.2)   Net incentive cost = (1) + (2.1) −0.163 −7,274
(2.3)   Net long-run fiscal effects of equal employment and 
population growth 
0.000 0
(2.4)   Gross effects of extra jobs on revenue from business tax base 0.011 485
(2.5)   Required public services for extra jobs −0.006 −285
(2.6)   Net fiscal effects of “profit” on extra business tax base = 
2.4 + 2.5 
0.005 200
(2.7)   Reduced social spending and unemployment benefits due to 
higher employment rates 
0.019 845
(2.8)   Sales/income taxes on increased personal income of local 
residents = 3.8 
0.018 795
(2.9)   Property taxes on increased real estate values 0.008 343
(2.10) Short-run fiscal effects: Positive if underutilized 
infrastructure, negative if growth requires expensive new 
infrastructure 
Uncertain    Uncertain
(2.11) Net quantifiable fiscal effect = 2.6 + 2.7 + 2.8 + 2.9 0.049 2,183
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Category
Benefits/costs as % of 
local personal income for 
1% induced employment 
growth (column A) 
Benefits/costs in annual 
real 2003 dollars per 
induced job (column B) 
(3) Labor market effects 
(3.1)   Gross real earnings gains for local residents 0.317 14,104
(3.2)   Extra real earnings on new job 0.916 40,766
(3.3)   Subtracting out earnings of in-migrants = 80% of (3.2) −0.733 −32,613
(3.4)   Net earnings of local residents on new jobs = 3.2 + 3.3 0.183 8,153
(3.5)   Increase in real wages due to promotion of local residents to 
better-paying occupations = 3.1 − 3.4 
0.134 5,950
(3.6)   Loss of social spending transfers = 2.7 −0.019 −845
(3.7)   Net increase in real income of local residents before taxes = 
3.4 + 3.5 + 3.6 = 3.1 + 3.6 
0.298 13,258
(3.8)   Sales/income taxes on increased income of local residents −0.018 −795
(3.9)   Increase in income of local residents after taxes = 3.7 + 3.8 0.280 12,463
(3.10) Reservation wages in low unemployment local area = 
90% of 3.4 
−0.165 −7,338
(3.11) Reservation wages in high unempl. area: assumed zero 0.000 0
(3.12) Net labor market benefits in low unemployment area = 
3.9 + 3.10 
0.115 5,125
(3.13) Net labor market benefits in high unemployment area = 
3.9 + 3.11 
0.280 12,463
(3.14) Shorter-run or longer-run labor market benefits: probably 
greater in short-run, less in long-run 
Uncertain Uncertain
(4) Real estate effects 
(4.1)   Gross gains in real estate values, as annual income flow 0.077 3,426
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Category
Benefits/costs as % of 
local personal income for 
1% induced employment 
growth (column A) 
Benefits/costs in annual 
real 2003 dollars per 
induced job (column B) 
(4.3)   Net gain to property owners 0.069 3,083
(5) Locally-owned business effects: Profit increase at businesses 
serving local market, decrease at export-base businesses. 
Uncertain Uncertain
(6) Environmental/congestion effects: likely to be negative unless 
project involves restoring brownfields 
Uncertain Uncertain
(7) Community effects: Some loss in community character and 
increased rents for local residents for growth beyond original 
community size, some gain for growth that restores community’s 
customary size 
Uncertain Uncertain
Total quantifiable effects 
(8.1) In low unemployment local labor market = 1 + 2.11 + 3.12 + 4.3 0.016 692
(8.2) In high unemployment local labor market = 1 + 2.11 + 3.13 + 4.3 0.181 8,030
Table 5A.1  (continued)
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equation that the foregone taxes as percentage of income to induce 1 percent 
employment growth will be = 100(dT/Y) = ([1% employment growth/E](T/Y), 
where T is now business taxes in dollar terms, Y is personal income, and state/
local business taxes as a percent of personal income are assumed to be 5.46 
percent, based on calculations in Bartik (1991a, p. 180). 
Lines (2.1) through (2.2) present a side calculation showing fiscal effects 
and net incentive costs if the only fiscal effects considered are the extra busi-
ness tax revenue from enhancing the business tax base. This extra business 
tax revenue is simply the business tax revenue associated with the induced 
jobs. Line (2.1)(B) is business tax revenue per job in 2003 dollars, based on 
calculations in Note 4, as the (B) column expresses everything per one induced 
job. Line (2.1)(A) is 1 percent of average business tax revenue as a percent of 
personal income, because the (A) column expresses everything per 1 percent 
in induced extra employment. Line (2.2) then shows a supposed “net incentive 
cost,” which, however, is erroneous because it omits all the fiscal effects from 
the public services associated with the extra business tax base, as well as the 
taxes and public services associated with the extra households, and the effects 
of higher employment on the need for social services and revenue from the 
property tax. This erroneous calculation is the style of calculation frequently 
done by advocates for incentives who claim that such incentives “pay for them-
selves.” Line (2.2) shows that such incentives clearly don’t pay for themselves 
even if we only look at the business tax base gains. 
To simplify the analysis of the full fiscal effects, I start from the baseline 
of the long-run fiscal effects of employment growth and population growth 
when both increase by the same percentage. This baseline is straightforward 
to analyze, and the actual net fiscal effects of the incentive-induced growth are 
then analyzed as effects of deviations from this baseline. Line (2.3) assumes 
that if state and local public services are constant returns to scale in the long 
run, as indicated in Fisher (1996) and Inman (1979), a balanced increase in 
employment and production should produce equal tax revenue and public ser-
vice needs. But of course we don’t expect that induced jobs will bring about 
the same percentage increase in population. Based on Bartik (1991a, 1993), we 
expect that for a given percentage increase in induced employment, the per-
centage increase in population will be about four-fifths as much. So we analyze 
the fiscal effects as if for every 1 percent in induced jobs, we have four-fifths of 
1 percent in increased population. The fiscal effects then are a combination of a 
“balanced” increase of four-fifths of 1 percent in both employment and popula-
tion, which should have zero fiscal effects in the long run, and the fiscal effects 
of the “extra” one-fifth of 1 percent of jobs. The effects of these extra jobs 
are the effects of these extra jobs on the business tax base and required public 
services, as well as the effects of the extra jobs, via a higher employment rate, 
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on the taxes and transfers associated with higher earnings for local residents, 
considered in the section on labor market effects. 
Line (2.4) calculates the business taxes from the extra jobs as one-fifth 
of the business taxes from the business tax base associated with all the jobs, 
from line (2.1). Line (2.5) is based on Oakland and Testa’s (1996) calculation 
that business tax revenue is 70 percent greater than public services directly 
required by businesses. Line (2.7)(A) is based on estimates from Bartik and 
Eberts (1999) that 1 percent employment growth reduces welfare caseloads 
by 6 percent, and estimates by Chernick and McGuire (1999) that own-source 
state and local spending on social services is 1.3 percent of personal income; 
social services spending is assumed to decline by the same percent as welfare 
caseloads. This yields a decrease in social services spending as a percent of 
income of −0.008 percent. This may seem small compared to overall earnings 
gains of 0.317 percent (see line (3.1) below), but growth is only modestly pro-
gressive; about 4.2 percent of the total earnings gains from stronger regional 
labor demand goes to the bottom income quintile, which is not much more 
than their share of income (Bartik 2001, Table 5.3). In addition line (2.7)(A) is 
based on estimates (Bartik 1991b, Table 2) that 1 percent extra local employ-
ment growth in the short run reduces unemployment payments by 3.4 percent. 
Based on 1995 statistics from O’Leary and Wandner (1997, p. 733), and 1995 
personal income data from the Regional Economic Information System, UI 
benefits are 0.33 percent of personal income, so a 3.4 percent reduction in 
such payments will reduce unemployment benefit payments by 0.011 percent 
of personal income. Adding 0.011 percent to the 0.008 percent reduction in 
social spending yields the 0.019 percent figure shown in line (2.7)(A). Line 
2.7(B) is derived from (A) by using ratios. Line (2.8) is based on the taxes as-
sociated with the extra earnings of local residents, and will be discussed further 
when the labor market section of the table is discussed. Line (2.9) is based on 
the property taxes on the increased real estate values associated with growth 
and is discussed further in that section. Line (2.9) is based on case studies by 
Altshuler and Gomez-Ibanez (1993) that show that new required infrastructure 
frequently vastly exceeds tax revenue from growth; because existing infra-
structure will eventually require replacement, this suggests that depreciation 
charges for existing infrastructure are understated. 
Line (3.1)(A) is based on estimates reported in Bartik (1991a, p. 163) on 
effects of growth on real earnings, expressed as a percent of personal income 
by assuming earnings are 73.5 percent of personal income (Bartik, 1991a, p. 
163). Line (3.1)(B) uses ratios to calculate this on a per job basis. Lines (3.2) 
through (3.5) attempt to divide line (3.1) into various components: gains for 
workers newly employed, vs. gains for workers already employed who get 
better jobs. Line (3.2) attempts to replicate what a naive benefit-cost analysis 
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would assume about earnings gains: they are equal to the earnings on the in-
duced jobs. Line (3.2)(B) is based on dividing total earnings by total employ-
ment, using 2002 data from the Regional Economic Information System. Line 
(3.2)(A) uses ratios to calculate this as a percent of personal income. Line (3.3) 
subtracts out the earnings of in-migrants to get the effects on local residents 
who get jobs in line (3.4). The rationale for subtracting line (3.3) is twofold: 
1) this analysis takes a local perspective in which only the original residents 
count, and 2) the analysis in Bartik (1991a) suggests that the well-being of 
in-migrants is not substantially affected by extra jobs in this local area, as the 
in-migrants would otherwise move to a similar local area. After subtracting 
line (3.4) from line (3.1), the remaining earnings gain must be from local resi-
dents moving up to better paying jobs. The residual calculation for line (3.5) 
appears roughly consistent with data from Bartik (1991a) on how employment 
growth affects occupational upgrading for local residents. The loss of transfer 
income in line (3.6) was previously derived for line (2.7). Line 3.8 is based 
on estimates from Citizens for Tax Justice that state and local personal sales 
and income taxes in 1995 averaged 6 percent of income for households in the 
middle income quintile (Ettlinger et al. 1996, Appendix 1, p. 51). In line (3.10), 
the reservation wage figure of 90 percent is used in Bartik (1991a) based on 
a review of the reservation wage literature. The assumption that reservation 
wages are zero for the unemployed in high unemployment areas is arbitrary. 
This assumption might be justified, even if nonwork time has some value for 
the unemployed, as seems likely, if unemployment has sizable social costs 
such as increased crime or increased social problems for the children of the 
unemployed. Lines (3.12) and (3.13) emphasize how different the labor mar-
ket benefits are based on different assumptions about reservation wages. Line 
(3.14) reflects that estimates suggest that the earnings effects reported in this 
table for local residents are probably greater in the short run and less in the 
long run than the medium-run figures used here (Bartik 1991a; Bartik 1994b). 
The question mark for line (3.14) suggests that it is unclear how this would af-
fect a present value analysis compared to simply using the medium-run annual 
flow benefits and costs reported in the table. 
Line (4.1)(A) comes from Bartik (1994b, Table 3) and is based upon es-
timates by Bartik (1991a) that 1 percent employment growth increases real 
estate values by 0.451 percent. A 10 percent real discount rate is used to con-
vert changes in capital values to annual flows. Line (4) (B) is derived from 
(A) using ratios. Line 4.2 is based on Table 3.13 of the 2001 American Hous-
ing Survey, which estimates that the median residential property tax rate for 
owner-occupied housing is 1 percent of value (U.S. Census Bureau 2001). 
The line (5) discussion assumes that only locally owned businesses should 
be considered in this local benefit-cost analysis. This is consistent with this 
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analysis focusing on the perspective of the state or metropolitan area, and ig-
noring effects on the federal government, or other state or metropolitan areas. 
Growth will clearly increase nominal wages and prices, as shown in Bartik 
(1991a), which reduces profits for businesses selling to outside markets. But 
businesses with some comparative advantage that they can maintain as the area 
grows (e.g., a local newspaper) will likely increase profits due to growth, as 
discussed in Bartik (1991a). For more discussion of environmental effects of 
local economic development, and of brownfields, see Bartik (2004b). 
The line (7) entry assumes that in a world with imperfect mobility, changes 
in a community’s “character” that bring it away from the originally chosen 
amenity package of the area’s households, with the accompanying wage and 
price changes, will reduce utility of the area’s original residents, as these origi-
nal residents must have preferred the original amenity package given prevail-
ing wages and rents. For more on this type of model, see Bartik (1991a, pp. 
73–76), and Bartik (1986). 
There is considerable uncertainty in these figures; for example, I could 
come up with a rationale for adjusting the incentive cost figures and the earn-
ings gains numbers up or down by 50 percent or more. Stating the numbers in 
this table to three, four, or five digits is an aid to calculation, but is a misleading 
indication of how much we really know. Therefore, it would be relatively easy 
to come up with a scenario under which quantifiable net benefits of economic 
development in a low unemployment area are negative. 
Notes
 This chapter reprinted by permission. See Bartik (2005).
 1. I have previously written about incentives in Bartik (1990; 1991a; 1993; 
1994a,b,c; 1996a,b; 2001; 2003; 2004a,b), as well as in Bartik, Erickcek, and 
Eisinger (2003). My comments on the benefi ts and costs of incentives from a 
state and local perspective are reasonably consistent. As I will footnote later, my 
comments on federal intervention in incentives have some inconsistencies.
 2.  The following Michigan programs are cash or near-cash incentives to large busi-
nesses: property tax abatements, one-third of tax increment fi nancing, MEGA 
tax credits, brownfi eld tax credits, Renaissance zones, and federal Empowerment 
Zone/Enterprise Community funding. Together these programs comprise $531 
million of the $706 million in annual Michigan economic development resourc-
es. Michigan also spends $13 million on customized job training, $60 million in 
federal community development block grants on infrastructure development for 
economic development in nonurban communities, and $48 million on business 
recruitment and retention. The remainder of Michigan economic development 
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resources are devoted to small business development, high-tech research, and 
manufacturing extension.
  3. Although this is the general consensus, not all scholars agree that state tax ef-
fects on business location are signifi cant. The most prominent scholarly critic of 
the notion that state taxes affect business location is McGuire. McGuire admits, 
however, that her position is inspired in part by fears of how state policymakers 
will respond to the conclusion that taxes affect business location. According to 
McGuire:
. . . I confess to being somewhat (perhaps very) irrational in my 
interpretation of this literature. With respect to the interstate and 
interregional studies, despite the number of studies with signifi -
cant coeffi cients, I fi nd it diffi cult to be convinced that taxes are 
an important factor in explaining differences in business location 
decisions and economic activity between states or regions. In part 
I believe the discrepancy between my conclusion and that of many 
other scholars of the topic is due to our different perspectives. I 
came to this topic through the tax-study, blue-ribbon-commission 
route. I have seen fi rsthand state policymakers grasping for straws. 
I simply do not think that the evidence allows us to comfortably 
advise lawmakers that reducing the corporate income tax rate or 
the personal income tax rate will revive a fl agging state economy. 
(McGuire 2003)
 4.  This calculation is as follows: the tax elasticity of private employment with re-
spect to state and local business taxes (E) is defi ned as (dJ/J)/(dT/T), where J is 
the number of jobs, dJ is the change in the number of jobs, T is the tax rate, and 
dT is the change in the business tax rate. The percentage change in revenue from 
a tax cut, dR/R, will approximately equal dT/T = dJ/J.
   Substituting and rearranging, one obtains, for the net foregone revenue cost 
per job created, dR/dJ = (R/J)[1 + (1/E)]. R/J is state and local business tax rev-
enue per job, which was about $1,634 per job in the United States as of 1989. 
With a value of −0.25 for E, one obtains dR/dJ = −$4,902. Updating by the 
change in consumer price index from 1989 to 2003 gives a fi gure in 2003 dollars 
of (184/124)4,902 = $7,274. The fi gure of $1,634 for state and local business 
taxes per private employee comes from three sources. Total state and local tax 
revenue in fi scal year 1989 was $469 billion (U.S. Census Bureau 1991, p. 21). 
One estimate of the business share of state and local taxes is 31 percent (ACIR 
1981, revised version of table A-1; fi gures for 1977). Private nonagricultural 
employment in the United States averaged 89 million during fi scal year 1989 
(U.S. Department of Commerce 1991, S-10). These fi gures could be updated 
using more recent data, but most of the studies were estimated using earlier data, 
so use of this historical data is probably better. The elasticity used is a compro-
mise between the −0.3 preferred in the literature review by Bartik (1992) and the 
−0.2 preferred by Wasylenko (1997). The Consumer Price Index fi gures come 
from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. I used an identical calculation in Bartik 
(2004a, 1992). The dynamic calculation here only looks at effects of taxes on 
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the business tax base, and ignores extra public expenditures required by a higher 
business tax base, and extra taxes and required public expenditures because of a 
larger household tax base.
   The cost in static tax revenue is dR = JdT, which, per job created by lower 
business tax rates, is JdT/dJ = T(1/E) = (business tax base per job) (1/0.25). Us-
ing the same fi gures the loss in static revenue from a business tax cut in 2003 
dollars is $9,699 = 1,634(184/124)(1/0.25). 
  5. Derived from Fisher and Peters (2002, Table 3.7). This takes their present value 
of incentives per job in the highest subsidy city and state of $22,678 in 1994, 
translates this into an annual equivalent by multiplying by the 10 percent dis-
count rate used by Fisher and Peters, and then adjusts to a 2003 value using the 
Consumer Price Index, or (1984/148.2) × (0.10)(22,678) = 2,816.
  6. An annual subsidy of $2,816 per job will yield a gross cost of $9,699 per induced 
job, as previously calculated, if the proportion of induced jobs (p) satisfi es the 
equation p = $2,816/$9,699 = 0.29.
  7. These calculations are based on Fisher and Peters’ fi gures for the mean value of 
“general incentives” per job in 1994, translated into an annual equivalent and 
updated to 2003 dollars.
  8. What about migrants? I explore this in Bartik (1991a, Chapter 3). The argument 
is that persons on the margin of migrating in, or migrating out, do not have their 
opportunities substantially affected by changes in the characteristics of this one 
local area. If the local area had remained unchanged, with no growth, the persons 
who would have otherwise migrated in would choose other, similar metropolitan 
areas. Similarly, the individuals whose outmigration is averted by growth are by 
defi nition close to indifferent between staying or moving.
  9. For more “market failure” analysis of state and local economic development 
policy, see Bartik (1990, 1994c) or Courant (1994).
  10. This fi scal impact analysis is imperfect. The fi scal impact analysis only looks at 
state revenues, and not at state expenditures, or local taxes and expenditure. In 
addition, a full benefi t-cost analysis would include labor market benefi ts. See 
Bartik, Erickcek, and Eisinger (2003) for a more detailed discussion of MEGA.
 11. More extensive discussion of clawbacks is found in Peters (1993) and Weber 
(2002).
 12. This is advocated by Bartik (2001) and Schweke and Woo (2003).
 13. Favoring the unemployed in jobs associated with business subsidies would seem 
likely to be acceptable discrimination from a legal perspective. Favoring local 
residents is more open to question.
 14. More on “First Source” programs is in Anderson (1999); Bartik (2001, Chapter 
9); Molina (1998); and Schweke (1999).
 15. I have been inconsistent over the years in my comments on federal regulation of 
incentives. I have sometimes been tempted by the notion that the federal govern-
ment should intervene to prevent the wasteful incentives of state and local areas 
with low unemployment. In the current political environment, I am pessimis-
tic that an intervention that comes at no federal cost, such as taxing incentives, 
would be so benign as to simply target wasteful incentives.
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